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The FDA Sends Smoke Signals to Big Tobacco:
Will the FDA Suffer Backlash,
Will Alcohol Be Regulated Next,
and Will the Health of Americans Prevail?
INTRODUCTION
On August 28, 1996, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) boldly
announced its controversial regulation of tobacco products.' The ruling
received sharp criticism from several members of Congress who believe
the FDA has neither the time nor the resources to regulate the tobacco
industry.2 The tobacco, advertising, convenience store, and medical
device industries also questioned the ruling and contended that the
FDA has no business regulating tobacco.3 President Clinton,' the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC),' and groups such as the Campaign for
1. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smoke-
less Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,398 (1996)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897).
2. See Jeanne Cummings, Preventative Care Gains Support; But Gingrich Rejects
Targeting Tobacco, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 26, 1996, at 12A, available in LEXIS,
News library, Curnws File; see also Interview by Natalie Allen with Rep. Scott
Baesler (D-KY),(CNN television broadcast, Aug. 21, 1996), available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File (stating that Rep. Scott Baesler is against the FDA proposal
because of the impact it will have on tobacco farmers).
3. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. United States FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C.
1997). Other plaintiffs in Coyne Beahm, Inc. include Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., Lorillard Tobacco Co., Philip Morris Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., American
Advertising Federation, National Association of Convenience Stores, and United States
Tobacco Co. See id. at 1374.
If the FDA's ruling and restrictions go into effect, the advertising industry will
lose "thousands of jobs and between $712 million and $2.1 billion in billings per
year." See Daryl Travis, A Look At . .. Selling Tobacco: Advertising Our Dishonor;
My Industry Should Be Ashamed of Itself for Pushing Cigarettes on Kids, WASH.
POST, Sept. 8, 1996, at C3.
4. See Remarks By the President During the Announcement of Food and Drug
Administration Rule on Children and Tobacco, FDCH FED. DEP'T AND AGENCY Docu-
MENTS, Aug. 23, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
5. See FTJC Voices Support For FDA's Goal of Reducing Use by Children, Adoles-
cents, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Jan. 8, 1996, at D3 available in LEXIS, Health Li-
brary, BNA Health Pubs.
Tobacco-Free Kids,6 however, commended the FDA for taking affirma-
tive action to protect the health of future generations. Additionally, a
national opinion poll revealed that a majority of Americans, "including
eighty percent of Southerners and smokers," support the FDA's ruling
to regulate tobacco products.7 Despite the nation's seeming approval of
the ruling, the legalities and politics intertwined with the ruling may
prevent implementation of these regulations.8
This Comment discusses the FDA's ruling, its criticisms and impact,
as well as the politics involved. More specifically, Part I describes the
purpose and function of the FDA,9 the FDA's reasons for deciding to
regulate tobacco,' ° and the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction over tobac-
co." Part II analyzes the litigation opposing the FDA ruling, 2 as well
as the impact of the ruling on the tobacco industry and society as a
whole. 3 Part III explores the politics intertwined with the ruling, 4 the
contemporaneous FDA reform legislation spawned in Congress, 5 and
the proposed settlement between the state attorney generals and the
tobacco companies. 6 Part TV sets forth the implications of the FDA
ruling for other industries, focusing particularly on the alcohol indus-
try.7 This Comment concludes by discussing the likelihood that the
ruling will be implemented as written and whether implementation of
the ruling is socially desirable. 8
6. See Anti-Tobacco Ads Hit Marks, Says Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 7, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
7. See Arnesa Howell, Poll Shows Strong Support For FDA Rule to Prevent Sales,
Marketing to Children, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Sept. 6, 1996, at D13, DI3, available
in LEXIS, Health Library, BNA Health Pubs. File.
8. See infra notes 95-130 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 25-85 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 95-130 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 131-49 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 150-69 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 170-91 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 192-219 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 220-58 and accompanying text.
18. See infra pp. 29-30.
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I. THE FDA RUUNG
A. The History and Background of the FDA
In 1938, Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
(FDCA) to protect consumers' health and welfare by preventing the
introduction or receipt of misbranded or adulterated medicines, foods,
or cosmetics. 9 To give effect to the FDCA, the FDCA conferred the
authority to issue regulations to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services.' ° Furthermore, the FDCA granted the Secretary authority to
restrict the sale, distribution, or use of drug delivery devices.2'
The Secretary delegated the authority to act under the FDCA to the
Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).22 To pro-
tect consumers, the FDA has the "power to approve and regulate drugs,
vaccines, over-the-counter remedies, food additives, medical devices,
and animal medications; to inspect factories and set standards on food
production; to sample marketed foods for impurities; and to regulate
advertising for food, drugs, and cosmetics."23 The FDA claims jurisdic-
tion to regulate tobacco products under these delegated powers.
B. The FDA's Research of the Tobacco Industry
The FDA's extensive research of the tobacco industry led to the for-
mulation of the 1996 Ruling regulating the sale, distribution, and adver-
tising of tobacco products. The FDA uncovered the following statistics
concerning tobacco use in general: (1) currently, almost fifty million
people in America smoke cigarettes;25 (2) an additional six million use
smokeless tobacco;26 (3) tobacco-related diseases claim the lives of
19. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994 & Supp. 1997); see also United States v. Two
Bags, Poppy Seeds, 147 F.2d 123, 126-27 (6th Cir. 1945) (discussing the intent of the
FDCA).
20. See 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1994).
21. See id. § 360j(e)(1).
22. See 21 C.F.R. § 5.10(a) (1997).
23. Perspectives GOP Sets Its Sight on Food & Drug Administration, MED. &
HEALTH, Feb. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
24. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,400
(1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897).
25. See id. at 44,398 & n.1.
26. See id.
over 400,000 Americans each year,2" exceeding the combined number
of deaths due to "acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), car
accidents, alcohol, homicides, illegal drugs, suicides, and fires."'
The FDA then focused its research on tobacco trends among children
and adolescents.29 A 1994 study revealed that almost three million ado-
lescents in the United States smoke cigarettes and another one million
male adolescents chew smokeless tobacco."0 Seventy percent of smok-
ers between the ages of twelve and seventeen regret starting to smoke
and sixty-six percent of adolescent smokers want to quit.31 More than
half of the eighty-two percent of adults who have ever smoked evolved
into regular smokers by the age of eighteen." Furthermore, research
indicates that an adult smoker who began smoking as a teen-ager in-
creases his or her risk of dying from a tobacco-related disease.' Most
importantly, one out of every three adult smokers who began smoking
as an adolescent and continued smoking as an adult will die premature-
ly because of their addiction.' 4
Subsequent to the FDA ruling, a new study was released bolstering
the FDA's findings.35 The study issued by the Office on Smoking and
Health at the Federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention dis-
covered that 5.3 million Americans under the age of eighteen smoke,
equaling almost eight percent of the total population of adolescents.'
The Center for Disease Control believes that these figures may be low
because of the "recent increases in smoking rates among minors."37
C. The FDA's Research Indicating How Advertising Affects Children
and Adolescents
Studies uncovered by the FDA indicate that teenagers are particularly
vulnerable to advertising of tobacco products for two reasons.' First,
27. See id. at 44,398 & n.3.
28. See id. at 44,398 & n.4.
29. See id. at 44,398.
30. See id. & n.7.
31. See id. at 44,398 & n.9.
32. See id. at 44,398 & n.8.
33. See id. at 44,399 & n.15.
34. See id. at 44,399 & n.17.
35. See John Schwartz, 5 Million Young Smokers Risk Early Death, CDC Report
Says, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1996, at A3; see also Chip Jones, Smoking Losses Out-
lined: CDC Officials Say It Cuts 12 Years Off Life, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov.
8, 1996, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
36. See Jones, supra note 35, at Al.
37. See id.
38. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smoke-
less Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,485.
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teenagers are at an age when their friends and peers are very important
to their identity.39 Secondly, the "benefit" to using tobacco products is
immediate while the health risks associated with smoking are not seen
for many years.4" Advertising works by relating the advertising to
teenagers' lives and by suggesting that peers are smoking cigarettes.41
In fact, an R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Corporation memorandom revealed
that adolescent smokers' choice of cigarettes represents a part of their
identity and that the better the advertised brand targets teenagers'
needs, the greater the probability that the advertised brand will be
bought.42 Advertisers employ these factors to exploit the only growing
market for tobacco products.43
Cigarette manufacturers spend approximately $3.25 billion per year
advertising their products.44 In 1994, a study revealed that eighty-six
percent of young smokers smoke the three most aggressively advertised
cigarette brands." Two recent studies concluded that the Joe Camel
logo is recognizable by thirty-three percent of all three-year olds and
almost every child over the age of six. 46 Consequently, Camel ciga-
rettes control one-third of the adolescent cigarette market.47 Tobacco
companies argue that despite the FDA's research, jurisdiction to regu-
late tobacco rests with Congress, not the FDA.48
D. Background of Tobacco Regulation
In 1965, Congress passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertis-




42. See id. at n.150.
43. See inftu notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
44. See Steven Shelov et al., Children, Adolescents, and Advertising; Committee on
Communications, 95 PEDIATRIcS 295 (1995), available in LEXIS, Genmed Library, Ped
File.
45. See Travis, supra note 3, at C3.
46. See Paul Mitchell Fischer et al., Brand Logo Recognition By Children Aged 3
to 6 Years: Mickey Mouse and Old Joe the Camel, 266 JAMA 3145, 3145 (1991)
(discussing advertising effects on children).
47. See Joseph R. DiFranza et al., RJR Nabisco's Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel
Cigarettes to Children, 266 JAMA 3149, 3149-53 (1991) (discussing the cigarette
industry's need to recruit new smokers and stating that 90% of new smokers are ado-
lescents).
48. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
tain specific health warnings." More recently, however, the act was
amended to enable tobacco manufacturers the choice of including
stronger, more effective warnings.' In 1970; Congress again amended
the Act, making it illegal for cigarette companies to advertise cigarettes
on any medium subject to Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
regulation.5 Additionally, Congress enacted the Comprehensive To-
bacco Health Education Act in 1986, subjecting smokeless tobacco
products and advertisements to many of the same restrictions as those
placed on cigarette products.52 This Act mandated warning labels on
all packages and advertisements' and prohibited the advertisement of
smokeless tobacco on all forms of electronic communication.' In
1992, Congress enacted the Synar Amendment (officially known as the
ADAHMA Reorganization Act).65 Although not implemented until Janu-
ary 1996,' the Act requires states to reduce the number of attempts
made by minors to purchase tobacco products. 7 As an enforcement
measure, the Act requires states to perform random checks of tobacco
retailers. Any states failing to comply with the Act risk losing federal
funds for alcohol and drug abuse prevention."
Over the past ten years, various bills were introduced in Congress
that would have restricted tobacco advertising and promotion, yet none
49. See 15 U.S.C. §§ .1331-1341 (1994).
50. See id. § 1333. Section 1333 requires that one of the following four warnings
be stated on cigarette packages and advertising:
[1.] SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart
Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
[2.] SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduc-
es Serious Risks to Your Health.
[3.] SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Re-
suit in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight.
[4.] SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon
Monoxide.
Id.
51. See id. § 1335.
52. See id. §§ 4401-4408.
53. See id. § 4402(a)(1)-(2).
54. See id. § 4402(f).
55. See ADAHMA Reorganization Act of 1992 § 1926, 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26 (1994).
56. See Smoking and the '96 Election: Clinton Ad Blasts Dole, HEALTH LINE, July
10, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
57. See ADAHMA Reorganization Act of 1992 § 1926; see also David E. Wilson,
North Ridgeville Eighth-Grader Takes Pledge, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 21, 1996, at 1B, 1B,
available in 1996 WL 3542638 (discussing the random checks required by the Synar
Amendment).
58. See ADAHMA Reorganization Act of 1992 § 1926(b)(2)(A); see also Karen Merk,
Tobacco Foes Want to Police Sales to Kids; Groups Offer Plan to Monitor Ban in
Jefferson Stores, COURIER-J., Aug. 28, 1996, at 1B, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File (discussing the effect of the Synar Amendment).
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were enacted.' For example, in 1987, House Bills 1272 and 1563 were
introduced in the House of Representatives.' These bills, if enacted,
would have prohibited all advertising of tobacco products, including the
sponsoring of sports activities and the distribution of free samples of
tobacco products.6' In 1989, House Bills 1250 and 1493 were intro-
duced in the House of Representatives.' If approved, these bills would
have restricted tobacco advertising to black-and-white text only.' Sim-
ilar to the bills presented in 1987, these later bills would have prohibit-
ed tobacco companies from sponsoring sports activities and distributing
promotional items featuring tobacco company logos.' In 1990, House
Bill 5041 was introduced.' The provisions in House Bill 5041, although
not enacted, emulated the mandate of the FDA's current ruling, re-
stricting most tobacco product advertisements to a black-and-white text
only format.' Additionally, the bill would have banned tobacco adver-
tisements within one thousand yards of schools, tobacco company
sponsorships of sports activities, and the distribution of free samples of
tobacco products.67
E. The FDA Ruling
The final FDA ruling, entitled "Regulations Restricting the Sale and
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children
and Adolescents," was the product of the aforementioned FDA re-
search.' The ruling reiterates the current law which prohibits persons
under the age of eighteen from purchasing tobacco products.' In an
effort to ensure that minors do not purchase tobacco products, the
ruling requires retailers to check the purchaser's picture identification
59. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
60. See H.R. 1272, 100th Cong. (1987); H.R. 1563, 100th Cong. (1987).
61. See H.R. 1272; H.R. 1563.
62. See H.R. 1250 § 3(a)(2)(A)-(B), 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 1493 § 3(a), 101st
Cong. (1989).
63. See H.R. 1250 § 3(a)(2)(A)-(B); H.R. 1493 § 3(a).
64. See H.R. 1250 § 3(a)(2)(A); H.R. 1493 § 3(b)(2).
65. See H.R. 5041, 101st Cong. (1990).
66. See id. § 5(a)(1)-(2).
67. See id. § 5(a)(3), (b).
68. See generaly Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes
and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396
(1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897) (discussing the
FDA's extensive research).
69. See id. at 44,439-40.
to verify that the purchaser is over the age of eighteen.7' Additionally,
the ruling prohibits the distribution of free samples of tobacco prod-
ucts.7' The rule also bans cigarette vending machines in any place
where minors are permitted.'
Arguably, the most controversial elements of the ruling are the adver-
tising restrictions. Pursuant to the ruling, tobacco product advertising
and labeling is limited to "black-and-white, text only format."" Fur-
thermore, billboard advertisements of tobacco products are prohibited
within one thousand feet of schools.74 The FDA ruling also prohibits
the distribution of non-cigarette promotional items featuring cigarette
brand names.75 Lastly, tobacco companies are forbidden from sponsor-
ing sporting events unless it is in the corporate name.7" Although the
above mentioned rules do not set forth all of the new FDA regulations
governing tobacco products, they are representative of the ruling as a
whole.'
The FDA's primary goal in issuing the ruling was to reduce the num-
ber of adolescents who smoke by fifty percent within seven years.'
The FDA's purpose was twofold.79 The FDA sought to reduce
children's access to tobacco products by prohibiting the distribution of
free samples, banning cigarette vending machines in locations where
minors are permitted, and by requiring photo verification for tobacco
purchases.' The FDA also hoped to decrease children's attraction to
70. See id. at 44,438-39. This element of the ruling is not challenged in the ongo-
ing FDA litigation and was implemented on February 28, 1997. See The Small Entity
Compliance Guide On: Regulations to Restrict the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes
and Smokeless Tobacco in Order to Protect Children and Adolescents; Availability, 62
Fed. Reg. 8974 (1997) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 897).
71. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smoke-
less Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,439, 44,460.
72. See id. at 44,439, 44,441, 44,448.
73. See id. at 44,439, 44,465-66. This element of the ruling was implemented on
August 23, 1997. See Johm Schwartz, Judge Hears Arguments on Tobacco Regulation,
WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1997, at A3 (discussing implementations of restrictions on to-
bacco advertising).
74. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,439,
44,465-66.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 44,439, 44,466.
77. See id. at 44,439, 44,448, 44,462. The ruling also requires a minimum package
size and the labeling of intended use information. See id.
78. See Maggie Mahar, Parting Shots: FDA Commissioner Sees No Special Deal
Ahead for Tobacco Companies, BARRON'S, Dec. 30, 1996, at 29, 30 (stating that 90% of
all smokers begin smoking before the age of eighteen).
79. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
80. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smoke-
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tobacco products by restricting print and billboard advertising and by
banning sport sponsorships and promotional items.8' The FDA believed
its ruling would result in a decrease in the amount of tobacco-related
illnesses in the future.'
When David Kessler, the Commissioner of the FDA, resigned, many
speculated as to the impact of his departure on the FDA's regulation of
tobacco.' Analysts predicted that Kessler's resignation would not sig-
nificantly affect the ruling because the ruling is backed by the Clinton
administration.' Kessler agreed and explained that the ruling was final
and only the courts or Congress, not a new FDA Commissioner, could
retract it.8
F. FDA's Claim to Jurisdiction Over Tobacco
The FDA asserted jurisdiction over tobacco products by classifying
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco as "combination products consisting
of drug (nicotine) and device components intended to deliver nicotine
to the body." ' The FDA was given the "discretion to determine which
less Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,396.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See John Carey & Mike France, Kessler is Leaving, His Crusades Aren't, BUS.
WK., Dec. 9, 1996, at 42, 42.
84. See Tobacco Regulations are Likely to Proceed, COURIER-J., Nov. 26, 1996, at
6A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
85. See Carey & France, supra note 83, at 42.
86. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,400.
For the FDA to have jurisdiction over "combination products," the prod-
ucts must a) contain a "drug" as that term is defined by the FDCA, and b)
have the primary purpose of delivering or aiding in the delivery of a drug.
Cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products meet both of these requirements.
Allison M. Zieve, FDA's Proposed Regulation of the Sale and Promotion of Tobacco
Products to Minors, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. PUB. HEALTH REP., May
1996, at 280, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
Drugs are defined by the FDCA as "articles intended for use in the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals;
and . . .articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of
the body . . . ." 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (1996); see Zieve, supra, at 280.
A device is any "instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance . . .or
other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory, which
is ... intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man .... " 21
U.S.C. § 321(h)(3) (1996).
authorities to apply in the regulation of combination products to pro-
vide the most effective protection to the public health."87 The FDA de-
termined that tobacco products were "most appropriately regulated
under the device provisions of the act, including the restricted device
authority in section 520(e) of the act (21 U.S.C. 360j(e)). "n Essentially,
the FDA brought tobacco products within its regulatory jurisdiction by
classifying nicotine as a drug and by classifying tobacco products as
drug delivery devices.
The FDA's regulation of nicotine patches bolstered the argument for
the FDA's jurisdiction over tobacco.' The regulation of the nicotine
patches provided "direct precedent for the FDA's decision to regulate
tobacco products as nicotine-delivery systems with the status of combi-
nation products."' Previously, the FDA did not consider tobacco prod-
ucts within its jurisdiction, but the FDA changed its position primarily
because of the overwhelming evidence that tobacco manufacturers
intended nicotine to "act as a drug."91 The evidence portrayed the to-
bacco companies as controlling the amount, form, and delivery of nico-
tine in their products.' Additionally, the evidence indicated that the
tobacco companies attempted to improve their products by researching
the effect of nicotine on humans. 3 The tobacco companies adamantly
objected to the FDA's claim of jurisdiction and filed a lawsuit contest-
ing it . 4
87. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,400; see Safe Medi-
cal Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 301 (1996)).
88. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,400.
89. See id.
90. Id; see Zieve, supra note 86, at 280 (discussing the FDA's jurisdiction over
tobacco).
91. See Zieve, supra note 86, at 280. The Brown & Williamson Collection on the
internet contains the controversial documents and memoranda which disclose what
the tobacco companies really knew and when they knew it. See Brown & Williamson
Collection (visited Feb. 26, 1998) <http://www.llbrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/bw.html>. See
generally Clay Calvert, Smoking Out Big Tobacco: Some Lessons About Academic
Freedom, The World Wide Web, Media Conglomeration, and Public Service Pedagogy
From the Battle Over the Brown & Williamson Documents, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 391
(1997) (discussing the impact of the Brown & Williamson collection).
92. See Zieve, supra note 86, at 280.
93. See id.
94. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. United States FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C.
1997); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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II. THE RuLING'S OPPOSITION AND IMPACT
A. The Litigation in Response to the FDA's Ruling
In September and October of 1995, members of the tobacco, advertis-
ing, and convenience store industries filed complaints against the FDA
in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina 9
The plaintiffs, Philip Morris Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Corp., and
other related groups, sought an injunction to prevent the FDA from
asserting jurisdiction now and in the future. ' Kentucky, North Caroli-
na, and Virginia! filed amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs.' The
plaintiffs filed a summary judgment motion in October of 1996.0 On
April 25, 1997, presiding Judge William Osteen granted partial summary
judgment, holding that jurisdiction to regulate cigarettes and tobacco
products rests with the FDA, but that the FDA had exceeded its author-
ity by attempting to regulate tobacco manufacturers' advertising and
marketing." The FDA appealed this partial summary judgment on
June 5, 1997."'
In the litigation, the plaintiffs primarily argue that the FDA has no
authority or jurisdiction to regulate tobacco"2 and that the advertising
restrictions established by the FDA's ruling violates the First Amend-
ment."° The plaintiffs also argue that the FDA cannot regulate a drug
95. See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1374; see also supra note 3 and ac-
companying text (discussing opposition to FDA regulation of tobacco).
96. See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1374; see also Hillary Kessler, Big
Suits, AM. LAw., Oct. 1995, at 95, 95; supra note 3 and accompanying text.
97. See Gilmore's Defense of Big Tobacco, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Nov.
19, 1996, at A4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
98. See Lawsuits: Cos. File Against FDA Rules; Texas Trial Set, HEALTH LINE, Oct.
16, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Focus on To-
bacco Lawsuits].
99. See id.
100. See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1396-97, 1399-1400; see also NC Judge
Says FDA Can Regulate Cigarettes, But Not Advertising, CONSUMER PRODUCT LITIG.
REP., June 1997, at 6609, 6609, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
101. See FDA Asks 4th Circuit to Reverse Ruling on Power to Regulate Tobacco
Ads, 11 MEALEY'S LrTG. REP.: TOBAccO No. 5 (1997) available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Curnws File.
102. See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1379; see also Focus on Tobacco Law-
suits, supra note 98.
103. See Charles J. Hardner, Comment, Is it Curtains for Joe Camel? A Critical
Analysis of the 1995 FDA Proposed Rule to Restrict Tobacco Advertising, Promotion
and Sales to Protect Children and Adolescents, 16 Loy. LA. ENT. L.J. 399, 413-21 nn.
that is known to be harmful because if the FDA did regulate it, it would
have to ban it altogether.'"
1. The Jurisdiction Argument
The plaintiffs' primary opposition to the FDA's assertion of jurisdic-
tion and its subsequent ruling is their belief that Congress, not the FDA,
has jurisdiction over tobacco.' °5 The plaintiffs claim that if Congress
intended for the FDA to regulate tobacco products it would have specif-
ically given the FDA jurisdiction, but Congress has never granted the
FDA that authority.' 5 Additionally, in the past, Congress rather than
the FDA regulated the tobacco industry.'7 The plaintiffs also contend
that the FDA lacks jurisdiction because the tobacco manufacturers do
not make the requisite "therapeutic claims."'0 8 The plaintiffs observe
the inconsistency allowing the FDA to regulate tobacco-the FDA only
approves drugs that it believes are safe, the FDA's regulation of tobacco
products implies FDA approval which suggests that smoking cigarettes
and chewing tobacco are not harmful."0
2. The First Amendment Argument
The second argument made by the plaintiffs is that the FDA restric-
tions on advertising violate free speech."' The Central Hudson
Test"' governs the modern commercial speech doctrine in determin-
100-36 (1995).
104. See John Carey et al., The FDA vs. Big Tobacco, Bus. WK., Aug. 28, 1995, at
34, 34 (stating that "[i]f it is declared a drug, tobacco must be shown to be safe and
effective in order to be legally sold-a test it cannot pass. Thus, the FDA could be
forced into a total ban by smoking opponents.").
105. See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1379; see also Margaret A. Boyd, Com-
ment, Butt Out!! Why the FDA Lacks Jurisdiction to Curb Smoking of Adolescents
and Children, 13 J. CoNrmlP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y. 169, 181 (1996) (stating that ciga-
rette products are not medical devices and thus cannot be regulated by the FDA);
Hardner, supra note 103, at 428-37. For more insight into the jurisdiction argument,
see Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing the FDA's (ffort
to Regulate Tobacco Products, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) ("[T]his article concludes
that the FDA regulations exceed the Agency's delegated authority ... .
106. See Hardner, supra note 103, at 428.
107. See supra notes 49-67 and accompanying text.
108. See Zieve, supra note 86, at 280 (stating that the FDA cannot regulate a
product unless the manufacturer makes a health-related claim regarding the product).
109. See Jeff Millar, Joe Camel is "Happy" at FDA Ruling, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 1,
1996, at 6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
110. See Hardner, supra note 103, at 413-21 nn.100-36.
111. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
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ing the protection of commercial speech.' Commercial speech is pro-
tected only if it is truthful and concerns a lawful activity."' After this
determination, the government's restriction(s) will be valid if (1) the
government's interest is substantial; (2) the restriction directly advances
the government's interest; and (3) the regulation is not broader than
necessary."' However, in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tour-
ism Co. of Puerto Rico,"' the Court weakened the last two prongs by
deferring to the judgment of the local legislature."6 The plaintiffs at-
tack the FDA by claiming the government's interest is not substantial
and that the FDA's regulation is broader than necessary."' The plain-
tiffs assert that there is a more direct way to achieve the FDA's goal,
such as a more strict adherence to the law that prohibits minors from
buying cigarettes."'
The most recent Supreme Court decision alleged to impact the tobac-
co litigation against the FDA is 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Is-
land,"' which overruled Rhode Island's statutory ban on liquor price
advertising because it violated the First Amendment.' However, FDA
proponents argue that the 44 Liquormart decision is not applicable to
the FDA ruling because the Court's holding was limited to factual in-
formation, such as the price of liquor, which is not comparable to imag-
ery manipulated in advertisements used to entice children. 2'
112. See id. at 561-65.
113. See id. at 563-64.
114. See id. at 564.
115. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
116. See id. at 340-48.
117. See Hardner, supra note 103, at 413-21 nn.100-36 (providing an in-depth
analysis of the commercial speech doctrine as applicable to the FDA ruling); see also
Daniel Helberg, Comment, Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA's Proposed Restrictions
on Cigarette Advertising Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
•1219, 1222 (1996) (stating that "[tihere is no doubt regarding the dangers of smoking
and the power of the media to influence buying behavior. However, the decision to
reduce cigarette smoking through advertising restrictions sacrifices First Amendment
principles, personal autonomy, and the health of existing smokers in the name of
political expediency.").
118. See Gail Appleson, Lawyers Say Proposed Tobacco Rules Limit Speech,
REIUTER'S FIN. SERVICE, Dec. 26, 1996, available in LEMS, News Library, Curnws File.
119. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
120. See id. at 1515.
121. See John Carey et al., The Fire This Time, Bus. WK., Aug. 12, 1996, at 66, 66.
The FDA may find support from the United States Court of Appeals
in the Fourth Circuit.'2 2 This court, which is where the FDA litigation
will presumably visit in the near future, upheld Baltimore's ban of "ciga-
rette and liquor advertising on billboards in areas of the city where chil-
dren are expected to walk to school or play." 2' The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals distinguished the 44 Liquormart case in Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore24 and Penn Advertising of Balti-
more, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore25 and held the ordinances constitu-
tional.'26 The decisions also cited the "Supreme Court's repeated rec-
ognition that children deserve special solicitude in the First Amendment
balance because they lack the ability to assess and fully analyze the
information presented through the commercial media."'27 In applying
the Central Hudson Test, the Fourth Circuit court determined that the
statutes in both cases were narrowly tailored to achieve their purpose
of protecting minors and were thus held constitutional.'28 On April 28,
1997, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in both Penn
Advertising and Anheuser-Busch.'29 Thus, precedent maintains that at
least part of the FDA ruling does not violate the First Amendment."3
B. Impact of the FDA Rule on the Tobacco Industry
The tobacco industry vehemently opposes the FDA's decision to regu-
late tobacco, primarily because it fears FDA regulation will diminish
revenues and profits.'' In response to the FDA's ruling, the individual
122. See infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
123. See John Schwartz, Tobacco Foes Encouraged by Ruling on Ad Ban, WASH.
POST, Nov. 16, 1996, at A4; see also Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. de-
nied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997); Milo Geyelin, Appeals Court Again Upholds Ban Involv-
ing Billboard Cigarette Ads, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1996, at B10 (discussing the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision to uphold the ban).
124. 101 F.3d 325.
125. 101 F.3d 332.
126. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 101 F.3d at 330; Penn Advertising of Baltimore,
Inc., 101 F.3d at 333. For analysis favorable to the plaintiffs, see Thomas D. Blue, Jr.,
Over the Edge: The Fourth Circuit's Commercial Speech Analysis in Penn Advertis-
ing and Anheuser-Busch, 74 N.C. L. REV. 2086, 2088 (1996) (arguing that the opinions
in Penn Advertising and Anheuser-Busch "violated the commercial speech doctrine").
127. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 101 F.3d at 329.
128. See id. at 330; Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc., 101 F.3d at 333.
129. See Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 117 S. Ct. 1569
(1997); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997).
130. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
131. See Amanda Walmac, Empty the Ashtray: Time is Running Out on Tobacco
Stocks, MONEY MAG., Nov. 1, 1996, at 76.
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lawsuits against tobacco companies, and the state suits seeking Medic-
aid reimbursement, stocks of the major tobacco companies (and their
suppliers) have fallen. 32 The tobacco companies view the youth mar-
ket as the only explorable market from which to increase revenues
because it is the only market where the number of people smoking is
actually increasing." The FDA's ruling seeks to destroy tobacco
companies' efforts to exploit the only growing product market by pre-
venting the companies from aiming advertisements at adolescents and
children.3"
If impeding the growing market does not decrease the tobacco com-
panies' revenue stream enough, the implementation of the FDA's ruling
may further decrease revenue by inhibiting effective marketing and
advertising to adults. 5 The tobacco companies greatly need addition-
al revenue in order to offset the major costs incurred in defending both
the FDA lawsuit and the suits filed by the states for reimbursement of
Medicaid/Medicare costs." The cigarette companies will be forced to
offset their costs through price increases.'37 Tobacco manufacturers
also fear that FDA regulation will inevitably lead to a ban on tobac-
Furthermore, the ruling may force tobacco companies to change their
products. For example, the tobacco manufacturers may be driven to
132. See id.
133. See generally George Dessart, And the Kids Keep on Lighting Up, WASH. POST,
Aug. 21, 1996, at A25. A report from the Center for Disease Control concluded that
35% of students in high school smoke cigarettes representing a 7% increase from
1991. See id. In fact, smoking is a greater problem among adolescents according to
the Center for Disease Control's recent report which concluded that only 25% of
adults smoke. See id.
134. See id.
135. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,439
(1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897).
136. See Walmac, supra note 131, at 76; see also Focus on Tobacco Lawsuits, supra
note 98.
137. See Walmac, supra note 131, at 76.
138. See Helberg, supra note 117, at 1270; see also John Head, Tobacco's End
Game? What's Next in the Continuing Battle Against Smoking? A Ban Against To-
bacco-a Smoker's Greatest Fear? Probably Not, But Here Are Some Scenarios That
Could Lie Ahead, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 17, 1996, at 1H, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File.
139. See Marlene Cimons, Can Regulating Tobacco Get Smokers to Kick the Habit?,
L.A. TIMES, June 20, 1994, at A5.
alter the levels of nicotine.4 ' Another possible reaction by tobacco
manufacturers would be to produce cigarettes with less nicotine, caus-
ing consumers to buy more cigarettes and the manufacturers, in turn,
would reap increased profits.' Additionally, if cigarette manufactur-
ers change their products to decrease the amount of nicotine, a black
market for the former type of cigarettes might emerge.
C. Impact of the Rule on Society
By issuing the ruling, the FDA attempted to save some of the 400,000
lives lost each year from smoking-related diseases." A major premise
of the FDA's ruling is to protect the health of future generations by
decreasing the number of children who begin smoking now, thereby
reducing the number of people who suffer from tobacco-related illness-
es in future years.'" A positive externality of the FDA's goal is a de-
crease in future health care costs for taxpayers.145 The FDA estimates
that the economic benefits of the ruling will be between $28 billion and
$43 billion a year due to the reduction in tobacco-related diseases.'
The FDA's approach is an attempt to implement preventative measures,
rather than America's typical approach of treatment. 47 On the other
hand, the ruling will have a negative financial impact on tobacco farm-
ers148 and advertisers."9
140. See id.
141. See id.; see also Head, supra note 138, at 1H.
142. See Cimons, supra note 139, at A5.
143. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,398
(1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897).
144. See id.; see also Carey et al., supra note 121, at 66 (stating that the goal of
the FDA's ruling is to save lives).
145. See generally Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes
and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,396;
Carey et al., supra note 121, at 66.
146. See Travis, supra note 3, at C3.
147. See Cummings, supra note 2, at 12A.
148. See Joe Ward, Tobacco Farmers' Profits Likely to Decline, Expert Says, Cou-
RIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 13, 1996, at 1B, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
149. See Travis, supra note 3, at C3; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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III. POLITICS AND FDA REFORM
A. Politics
In 1996, "in a strange reversal of the traditional debate over the ethics
of political advertising, the growing debate [was] over the ethics of
tobacco. . ."' The media turned the 1996 election into a morality,
ethics, and family values contest. 1 ' Contributions from the tobacco
industry together with positions on the FDA's tobacco regulation were
hotly debated political issues.'52 The tobacco industry's contributions
to Congress over the past few years have been astounding." In fact,
regulation of addictive drugs, such as alcohol and cigarettes, never
stemmed from those in politics because the tobacco and alcohol indus-
tries are such powerful players in the political arena." Out of the cur-
rent members of Congress, eighty-two percent of them received contri-
butions from the tobacco industry." According to a Common Cause
study, the tobacco industry contributed $2.4 million in soft money to
the Republican Party in 1995,1" compared to $546,000 in 1993, the pri-
or non-election year.' In 1995, the Democratic Party received less
than one-fifth the amount of the contributions given to Republicans."
On the other hand, the Democrats were the leading recipients of soft
money from litigators and law firms, who, incidentally, would be advan-
taged by increased tobacco litigation."' 9 In 1996, Philip Morris donated
150. Ira Teinowitz, The Politics of Vice; Campaign '96: Once Campaigns Were De-
cided in Smoke-Filled Rooms, Now the Polls are Lighting Debates Over Product Ads,
ADVERTISING AGE, July 8, 1996, at 1, 1; see Jef I. Richards, Politicizing Cigarette Ad-
vertising, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1147, 1177 (1996) (discussing tobacco as a "political
'hot potato'").
151. See Teinowitz, supra note 150, at 26.
152. See id.
153. See infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
154. See Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REV.
909, 923 (1992).
155. See John Carey, Commentary: Clinton's Antismoking Plan Won't Exactly Kick
Butt, Bus. Wi., Sept. 9, 1996, at 42, 42.
156. Here's What Some of those Campaign Donations Buy, USA TODAY, Dec. 12,
1996, at 14A. Soft money is "large donations from corporations, unions and wealthy
individuals that are exempt from the post-Watergate limits on campaign contribu-
tions." Id.
157. See Benjamin Wittes, Tobacco Lobby Keeps on Smoking, N.J.L.J., Apr. 22, 1996,
at 8.
158. See id.
159. See Cummings, supra note 2, at 12A.
$1.76 million to Republican political campaigns and almost $500 million
to the Democratic party."6 R.J. Reynolds/Nabisco (RJR) contributed a
total of $1.5 million to political campaigns as well."' These huge dona-
tions from the tobacco companies to the members of Congress repre-
sent an effort to fend off FDA regulation of tobacco. 6 These contri-
butions, coupled with the influence of powerful lobbies, inhibit Con-
gress from being an effective forum for tobacco regulation."
Besides the tobacco, advertising, and litigation interest groups lobby-
ing and contributing to Congress, the FDA has another enemy: the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)."M The ACLU sided with the
tobacco industry and has been fighting for the tobacco industry's right
to advertise to children."
The significant political impact of tobacco regulation also can be
viewed by the remarks made by prominent elected officials concerning
tobacco products and their regulation. When former Senator and 1996
presidential candidate Bob Dole remarked that nicotine was not addic-
tive for everyone and that the FDA should not regulate tobacco, the
Democrats were quick to acknowledge that Dole would just stand "idle
while 3000 kids a day start a habit that will kill one-third of them." "
Dole was not alone; House Speaker Newt Gingrich gave his opinion on
the FDA and its regulations as well, stating, "I think the FDA is a bu-
reaucracy that has overreached on a number of fronts. It is weakening
American job creations, weakening the introduction of new medica-
tions."16 7
With President Clinton's re-election and the Republican majority re-
maining in Congress, the political situation with regard to the FDA
remains the same: a supportive President and an opposing Con-
gress. " Because the election is over, Congress and the President have




163. See Wittes, supra note 157, at 8.
164. See Joshua Wolf Shenk, Steve Forbes, Joe Camel, and the ACLU: Government
Isn't the Only Threat to Our Civil Liberties, So is the Power of Money, WASH.
MONTHLY, Apr. 1996, at 8.
165. See id.
166. See Carey et al., supra note 121, at 66.
167. See Cummings, supra note 2, at 12A.
168. See Clinton's Return: Status Quo for the Industry, MARKETLETrER, Nov. 11,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; see also Congressional Change
Seen as More Significant, MARKETLETrER, Nov. 11, 1996, available in 1996 WL
12725301 (discussing the impact of the election on the FDA ruling).
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no fear of retaliation at the polls, and the FDA, sure to be at issue in
the current Congress, will be in the crossfire. 69
B. FDA Reform
The alleged main goal in reforming the FDA is to make safer drugs
available to the public faster." ° Yet, a major FDA concern is balancing
speed with safety.'7' Excessive caution, slowness, bureaucracy, and
intimidation have led to continuous criticism of the FDA.' 2 To remedy
these problems, the House Commerce Committee was to report on an
FDA Reform Bill in September 1996 based on three measures: House
Bills 3199, 3200, and 3201.' The Senate's reform bill, Resolution 1477,
was also expected to be discussed on the floor in September 1996.'"
Initially, the reforms were geared at getting drugs through the FDA
faster, decreasing the amount of paperwork, allowing contracting out or
third party review, and making the appellate process faster.'6 Other
reforms included the "use of pilot biologics facilities... and exempting
devices from notification requirements.' 76 However, FDA reform bills
did not see floor action for two reasons: (1) no one wanted to pass
controversial FDA reform legislation with the 1996 election around the
corner,' and (2) the bills were bogged down by "disputes over privat-
ization, expedited approval based upon foreign approval and dissemina-
tion of scientific information about off-label uses of FDA approved
drugs."'7 8 Now, FDA reform proposals include limiting the FDA's juris-
169. See Clinton's Return: Status Quo for the Industry, supra note 168.
170. See FDA Reform "Still Possible During This Congress", MARKETLETrER, Sept.
16, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
171. See FDA: Kessler Speaks on Reform, Tobacco, HEALTH LINE, Aug. 19, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
172. See Daniel Green, Obstacle Course for Drug Producers: Pressure for Reform of
the US Food and Drug Administration is Growing, FIN. TimS, Aug. 21, 1995, at 12.
173. See H.R. 3199, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 3200, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 3201,
104th Cong. (1996); see also FDA Reform "Still Possible During This Congress," su-
pra note 170 (discussing the possibility that FDA reform legislation would be passed).
174. See FDA Reform "Still Possible During This Congress," supra note 170.
175. See Jill Wechsler, FDA: Going up in Smoke?, PHARMACEUTICAL ExECuT , Oct.
1995, at 20.
176. FDA Reform "Still Possible During This Congress," supra note 170.
177. See Biotechnology Protected in Rewrite of Medical Patent Ban, BIOWORLD TO-
DAY, Sept. 9, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10571849.
178. Lisa Seachrist, BIO Looks to 105th Congress as Session Adjourns Without
Progress on FDA Reform, BIOWORLD TODAY, Sept. 25, 1996, available in 1996 WL
diction and possibly even reducing its budget." Also, legislation to
enact some of the provisions of the FDA ruling has been proposed."8
Consequently, FDA reform will be a major part of the Republican agen-
da in the current session of Congress, 8 ' and analysts expect that Con-
gressional FDA reform will be much easier with the resignation of FDA
Commissioner David Kessler.'82
Interestingly enough, the tobacco industry, drug manufacturers, and
manufacturers of medical devices initiated and instigated the FDA re-
form movement." These industries urging reform, diligently tried to
convince Congress that the FDA should be spending more of its budget
on accelerating the approval process for drugs and medical devices and
less on tobacco."' Ironically, the FDA spends most of its budget regu-
lating drugs and devices for the treatment of smoking-related diseas-
es. 18
Even though no reform bill passed, the FDA internally reformed itself
in response to criticism from various groups."l The FDA increased its
approval rate of drugs for marketing by thirty-two percent between
1994 and 1995.187 These drugs also received approval thirteen percent
faster in 1995 than in 1994.' 8 In 1995, the FDA reduced the approval
time for drugs with expected "important therapeutic value" by more
than half compared to 1994.1' The FDA also "approved a record forty-
10571934.
179. See Andrew Lawler & Richard Stone, FDA: Congress Mixes Harsh Medicine;
Efforts to Reform the Food and Drug Administration, AM. ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCE-
MENT OF Sci., Aug. 25, 1995, at 1038, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
180. See Mike France et al., Is Big Tobacco Ready to Deal?, Bus. Wy., Dec. 23,
1996, at 32; see also Mike Brown, Ford Again Offers Bill to Block FDA on Tobacco,
COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 24, 1997, at A8, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File (discussing Senator Ford's introduction of legislation which prohibits the
FDA's regulation of tobacco and imposes some of the FDA's restrictions on the sale
and marketing of tobacco).
181. See Senator Judd Gregg, The GOP Prescription for the 105th Congress, MSAs,
Medicare and Medicaid Reform, Oversight of Public Health Service Are on the Hori-
zon, ROLL CALL, Sept. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
182. See Michael Rust & Susan Crabtree, 105th Congress Anticipates FDA Reform
Party, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996, at 6.
183. See Wittes, supra note 157, at 8.
184. See id.
185. See Tobacco Declared 'Restricted Device; Is more Iqformation-Regulation by
FDA at Hand?, MED. DEVICE APPROVAL LETrER, Sept. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File.
186. See FDA Reform: Both Parties Trade Blame For Failure, HEALTH LINE, Sept.
10, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
187. See Rep. Thomas Bliley Jr., FDA Still Needs Reform Despite Improvements,
ROLL CALL, Sept. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
188. See id.
189. See id.
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six 'breakthrough' drugs in 1996-medicines never before sold in this
country-and took half as long as the European Union to get new treat-
ments onto pharmacy shelves.... "' However, the average time to
get a drug from the laboratory to a patient remained between twelve to
fifteen years with the average cost surpassing $350 million.191
C. Settlements Discussed Between Congress, the States,
and the Tobacco Industry
Moments after the FDA issued its ruling regulating tobacco, rumors
flew that state attorney generals were already making deals with the
tobacco companies.'92 The tobacco companies denied these
rumors.' The rumors suggested that the ruling was just another polit-
ical game, pushing the tobacco manufacturers to settle."M Besides the
FDA ruling, another factor allegedly enticing tobacco manufacturers to
make a deal was the pending lawsuits filed by attorney generals in forty
states and at least two California cities 9' seeking reimbursement for
190. Charles W. Henderson, Drug Development FDA Boasts of Quick Drug Approval,
DISEASE WKLY. PLUS, Jan. 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7719051.
191. See Bliley, supra note 187.
192. See Mike France et al., Big Tobacco May Be Ready to Deal, Bus. WK., Oct. 7,
1996, at 150.
193. See id.
194. See generally id.
195. The states that have brought Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement claims against
the tobacco companies are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Bob Van Voris, AGs' Claims
Mere Smoke?, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 28, 1997, at Al (stating that all the states listed above,
except as discussed below in this footnote, have filed suit against the tobacco manu-
facturers for reimbursement); see also Gail Appleson, Efforts Mount to Block Hasty
Tobacco Pact, REUTER Bus. REP., June 4, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File (discussing that New Hampshire filed its lawsuit seeking reimbursement
of medical costs); Tustin Amole, DeGette Falls 7 Votes Short in Floor Debut, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 25, 1997, at 5A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(stating that Colorado has filed its lawsuit for medical cost reimbursements); Lauran
Neergaard, Tobacco Deal Near but Not All Groups on Board, CHATTANOOGA FREE
PRESS, May 28, 1997, at A5, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (stating
that New Mexico filed its suit against the tobacco manufacturers); Ohio, STATES NEWS
BRIEFS, May 8, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (discussing
Ohio's filing of its lawsuit against the tobacco manufacturers); Vita Reed, Nevada Fol-
lows Other States in Suing Big Tobacco, LAS VEGAS Bus. PRESS, May 26, 1997, at 11,
millions of dollars in Medicare/Medicaid funds which the states had
spent "treating smoking related illnesses. "1"
The Liggett Group was the first and only tobacco company to date to
have officially accepted a deal. 97 Liggett agreed to abide by advertis-
ing regulations which target children and also dropped out of the North
Carolina litigation.98 Additionally, the Louisiana Castano class 99
would receive five percent of Liggett's income annually for twenty-five
years, and the states suing for Medicaid reimbursement would get a
percentage of Liggett's income plus a lump sum for the next ten
years.
200
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (stating that Nevada filed its claim
against the tobacco manufacturers); Liz Ruskin, State Takes on Tobacco; Lawsuit
Seeks Millions for Medical Expenses, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 15, 1997, at 1A,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (discussing Alaska's filing of a lawsuit
seeking, among other things, reimbursement of Medicaid expenditures); Tobacco Liti-
gation Update, AG BULL., June 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(noting that Vermont filed suit for reimbursement of medical expenses); Tobacco Liti-
gation Update, AG BuLL., May 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(stating that Pennsylvania and South Carolina filed lawsuits seeking reimbursement
from the tobacco manufacturers); Amy Trollinger, Weston Growers Vilify Government,
KAN. Crry Bus. J., May 16, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(stating that Missouri has joined the other states by filing suit against the the tobac-
co manufacturers); Ron Word, Jury Doesn't Blame RJR; Smoker's Death Result of
Choice, Not Addiction, CHArANOOGA TIMES, May 6, 1997, at Al, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curws File (reporting that Montana has filed its lawsuit against tobac-
co manufacturers); Assoc. Press, 2 More States Sue Tobacco Firms, WASH. TIMES,
June 19, 1997, at B6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (reporting that
Maine and Rhode Island filed their lawsuits against the tobacco manufacturers). The
two cities which have filed suit against the tobacco companies for Medicare/Medicaid
reimbursements are San Francisco and Los Angeles. See Tobacco Foes Gleeful at
Liggett Admission But Revelation Fails to Rattle Analysts; Case Called Symbolic, ST.
LOUiS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 21, 1997, at 14A, available in 1997 WL 3330958.
196. See Focus on Tobacco Lawsuits, supra note 98; see also Proposed Legislative
Deal Would Shield Tobacco Industry For 15 Years, MEALEY's LMIG. REP.: TOBACCO,
Sept. 6, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (discussing possible
deals between the tobacco manufacturers and state attorney generals).
197. See Tobacco Foes Gleeful at Liggett Admission But Revelation Fails to Rattle
Analysts; Case Called Symbolic, supra note 195, at 14A; see also Stop Smoking!,
ECONOMIST, May 11, 1996, at 21, 22.
198. See Stop Smoking!, supra note 197, at 22.
199. Tobacco product liability cases have, until recently, never been won because
the juries always felt that the smoker made the choice to smoke. See Benjamin
Weiser, Tobacco's Trials; Cigarette Makers Once Were So Hard to Beat in Court That
Many Top Lawyers Refused to Take Them On. Then a Group of Attorneys, Mostly in
Small Southern Towns, Found New Ways Past Tobacco's Defenses-and Now, the
Industry is Hinting About a Deal, WASH. POST MAG., Dec. 8, 1996, at 15, 19. The
Castano class, however, based its claim on the idea that the smokers did not have a
choice because of the nicotine addiction. See id. at 30.
200. See id. at 17.
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Critics predicted that the bigger tobacco players would not take a
deal and cautioned society not to accept a deal.2"1 To the critics' sur-
prise, on June 20, 1997, a proposal for the tobacco settlement with the
forty states seeking to recoup their Medicaid expenditures for tobacco-
related illnesses was announced. 2 Generally, the proposal provides
that the cigarette manufacturers pay $368.5 billion during the next
twenty-five years.2 3 The $368.5 billion serves to "compensate states
for the costs of treating smoking-related illness, to finance nationwide
anti-smoking programs and to underwrite health care for millions of
uninsured children."2"
More specifically, the provisions of the proposal include, among other
things, an initial payment of $10 billion by the cigarette companies to
the states, followed by annual payments of $8.5 billion per year which
eventually increase to $15 billion.2 5 In return, the states will dismiss
their lawsuits seeking Medicaid reimbursement.2" The proposal also
requires the dismissal of the aforementioned lawsuit pending in North
Carolina challenging FDA jurisdiction over tobacco.2"7 The settlement
bans future punitive damage awards against the cigarette companies in
exchange for their payment of fifty billion dollars in punitive damag-
es." The proposal sets forth penalties if the cigarette manufacturers
do not attain specific goals for reduction in teenage smoking.2 0 It
201. See France et al., supra note 180, at 32; see also Michael Siegel, Tobacco: The
$10 Billion Dollar Debate, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1996, at C7 (stating that "[w]hen the
tobacco industry comes to the bargaining table, it does so with a hidden agen-
da . . . . Any deal that the tobacco industry is willing to accept is one that we
should not want.").
202. See John M. Broder, Major Concessions: Industry Would Pay for the Costs of
Treating Diseases, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1997, at 1; Marc Fisher & John Schwartz,
Trying to Snuff Out the Tobacco Culture; Industry Gambles It Can Survive Efforts
to Stop Smoking's Seduction, WASH. POST, June 22, 1997, at Al; June 20, 1997 Set-
tlement Terms (visited Aug. 27, 1997) <http://stic.neu.edu/settlement/6-20-settle.htm>
(discussing the different aspects of the settlement); see also supra note 195 and ac-
companying text (listing the 40 states).
203. See Broder, supra note 202, at 1.
204. Id.
205. See id.; June 20, 1997 Settlement Terms, supra note 202.
206. See Broder, supra note 202, at 1; June 20, 1997 Settlement Terms, supra note
202.
207. See Broder, supra note 202, at 8; June 20, 1997 Settlement Terms, supra note
202.
208. See Broder, supra note 202, at 8; June 20, 1997 Settlement Terms, supra note
202.
209. See Broder, supra note 202, at 8; June 20, 1997 Settlement Terms, supra note
mandates cessation of all cigarette advertising and marketing directed
at teenagers, which includes a ban on all human and cartoon characters
portrayed in such advertising.21 ° It bans "product placement" in films
and television programs and bans cigarette company sponsorships of
sports events and concerts.2 ' An important concession favoring tobac-
co companies is the preclusion of all class action suits."2 The propos-
al also generally prohibits smoking in "public places, workplaces and
fast-food restaurants."213 Additionally, the proposal requires a stronger
warning/caution label on cigarette packs to indicate that "smoking is
addictive, causes fatal lung disease, causes cancer and can be dead-
ly." 4 The proposal further requires the cigarette companies to dis-
close all data on addiction and drug dependence and itemize all ingredi-
ents and additives.21 '
The settlement proposal is not without its critics, including the Amer-
ican Medical Association and former FDA commissioner David
Kessler.1 ' Although the proposal acknowledges that the FDA retains
jurisdiction over cigarettes and tobacco, the proposal also implements
an unprecedented, "heavy legal burden" on the FDA to "justify controls
on nicotine." 7 The proposal falls short of fully disclosing what the
cigarette companies know about nicotine and its effects and also man-
dates the confidentiality of some of the information that the companies
202.
210. See Broder, supra note 202, at 8; June 20, 1997 Settlement Terms, supra note
202.
211. See Broder, supra note 202, at 8; June 20, 1997 Settlement Terms, supra note
202.
212. See Broder, supra note 202, at 8; June 20, 1997 Settlement Terms, supra note
202.
213. Broder, supra note 202, at 8; June 20, 1997 Settlement Terms, supra note 202.
214. Broder, supra note 202, at 8; June 20, 1997 Settlement Terms, supra note 202.
215. See Broder, supra note 202, at 8; June 20, 1997 Settlement Terms, supra note
202.
216. See Broder, supra note 202, at 8. "The companies are a lot smarter at selling
cigarettes than the public health people are at unselling them." Myron Levin & Henry
Weinstein, Tobacco Foes Scour Pact for Smoke and Mirrors Settlement: Activists Fear
Accord May Yet Give Industry a Way to Sidestep Significant FDA Regulation at
Nicotine, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1997, at Al (quoting Michael Pertschuk, a former chair-
man of the FTC); see also George Rodriquez, AMA Lists Objections to Proposed To-
bacco Deal Doctors Say Settlement Gives Too Much, Seeks Too Little in Enforcement,
Money, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 1, 1997, at 1D (discussing AMA's perceived dan-
gers of the proposal). "'The danger is that once the tobacco industry gets the relief it
seeks, there is no incentive for them to cooperate further.'" Id. (quoting Richard F.
Corlin, speaker of the AMA's House of Delegates). For a discussion of remarks made
by David Kessler about the settlement proposal, see Broder, supra note 202, at 8.
"[Tihe industry ha[s] shown over the past 30 years that it can outwit-and
outspend-its foes and win from Congress what it could not achieve in court." Id.
217. See Levin & Weinstein, supra note 216, at Al.
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provide to the FDA."' Of course, Congress and President Clinton
must still approve the settlement agreement which, judging by the criti-
cisms, may take longer than the cigarette companies expected.2"'
IV. IMPACT OF THE FDA RULING ON THE ALCOHOL INDUSTRY
Alcohol and cigarettes often are mentioned in the same breath. Al-
though both substances are classified as addictive, the regulation of the
two products differs substantiallyY For the most part, Congress regu-
lated tobacco, and the alcohol industry internally and voluntarily regu-
lated alcohol.22" ' With the new FDA ruling, many groups such as
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and the Coalition for the Pre-
vention of Alcohol Problems, urged a similar ruling aimed at curbing
alcohol advertisements geared to entice adolescents to indulge.222 Ad-
vertising firms speculated that advertising regulation would next target
alcohol.' Legislators later proved them right by discussing and draft-
ing legislation aimed at the alcohol industry which mimicked the FDA's
tobacco advertising regulations.224 In fact, President Clinton and the
FCC threatened the alcohol industry with regulations similar to those
imposed on tobacco."
A. Alcohol Statistics
Tobacco and alcohol "each cause more death than all illicit drugs
combined."226 In 1991, "alcohol-related motor vehicle crashes" claimed
the lives of 14,727 people between the ages of sixteen and twenty.
227
218. See Assoc. Press, Shalala: Tobacco Deal Keeps Too Many Secrets, Cm. TRn.,
July 18, 1997, at Cl.
219. See Fisher & Schwartz, supra note 202, at Al.
220. See supra notes 49-58 and infra notes 240-47 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 49-58 and infra notes 240-47 and accompanying text.
222. See Ira Teinowitz, Alcohol Ad Restraints Suggested, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 6,
1995, at 8; Kennedy Unveils Ad Limits to Combat Underage Drinking, ALCOiOLISM &
DRUG ABUSE WI., May 20, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 8970745.
223. See Advertising Firm Fighting FDA on Tobacco Laws, GREENBORO NEWS &
REC., Nov. 6, 1996, at B6, available in LEXIS, News Library, NwsRec File.
224. See Ira Teinowitz & Joanne Ingrassia, Hear No Evil, See No Evil Ads in
1997?: Legislators in North America Eye Extra Rules for Sin-Free Ad Environment,
ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 14, 1996, at 116.
225. See David Leonhardt & Mike France, Absolute Folly? Liquor's TV Foray May
Create A Backlash Against All Alcohol Ads, Bus. WE., Nov. 25, 1996, at 46, 46.
226. Law, supra note 154, at 910.
227. See Shelov et al., supra note 44 (citing results from a 1991 National Highway
Alcohol is also "involved in more than one-fourth of teenage suicides
and homicides... "228 In general, children "begin drinking [alcohol] in
junior high school and by the time they're seniors, nearly thirty percent
of them binge drink, downing five or more at a time."229 Furthermore,
about four million adolescents and children are classified as "alcoholics
or problem drinkers."23"
B. Effect of Alcohol Advertising on Adolescents
Alcohol is the second most aggressively advertised product in Ameri-
ca.23' The average American child watches approximately thirty-five
hours of television a week2 .2 and views almost two thousand alcohol-
related commercials per year.2" Additionally, adolescents are "three
times as likely as adults to respond to ads." ' Alcoholic beverage ad-
vertisers market to teenagers by showing that drinking will help them
have more friends, fun, and sex appeal."s Alcohol advertisements,
similar to those of cigarettes, are geared to entice young people to con-
sume the manufacturer's product."s Advertisers of beer and wine
spent $391 million on TV advertising from January to July of 1996. 7
In particular, Miller Light and Budweiser were the two most heavily
advertised brands.2" The statistics suggest that alcohol is effectively
and aggressively advertised to adolescents.239
Traffic Safety Administration study).
228. Id. (citing a study of current adolescent trends).
229. Joseph P. Kennedy & George A. Hacker, Bah, Humbug to TV Liquor Ads,
BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 13, 1996, at 40.
230. Id.
231. See Law, supra note 154, at 919. "Second to tobacco, alcohol is the most
heavily advertised product in the United States." Id.
232. See Paul Froehlich, No Alcohol TV Ads, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 26, 1996, at 22 (stating
that "[klids watch about five hours of TV a day").
233. See Shelov et al., supra note 44 (citing an Adolescent Medicine article on the
relationship between the media and drugs).
234. Froehlich, supra note 232 (citing a recent study of cigarette advertising).
235. See Shelov et al., supra note 44.
236. See Teinowitz, supra note 222, at 8.
237. See Steve McClellan, What Hath Seagram Wrought? Beer, Wine Advertisers
Fearful Liquor Ads Will Backlash, Result in Ban for Them as Well, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Nov. 4, 1996, at 6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
238. See id.
239. See supra notes 231-38 and accompanying text (discussing the alarming alcohol
statistics and how advertising affects adolescents).
[Vol. 25: 617, 1998] The FDA Sends Smoke Signals to Big Tobacco
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
C. Background of Alcohol Advertisement Regulation
Generally, while Congress is responsible for regulating cigarette ad-
vertising, the states and the industry have assumed alcohol advertising
regulation."o In 1933, after the end of Prohibition, Congress autho-
rized the individual states to regulate alcohol within the states.41
Some aspects of alcohol regulation, however, remained under the con-
trol of the Constitution and Congress. 2 Only a few states actually
tried to restrict alcohol advertising, but all state regulation of the alco-
hol industry is limited by other interests.2"
Until recently, the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States (DIS-
CUS), the liquor trade association, maintained a voluntary ban of adver-
tisements for "hard" liquor on radio and television.2 In 1975, the alco-
hol and broadcasting industries also voluntarily banned radio and televi-
sion alcohol advertisements.2" However, on November 7, 1996, DIS-
CUS removed the ban"O in an effort to level the playing field between
beer, alcohol, and spirits.24 7 The lifting of the ban was a partial re-
sponse to Seagram & Sons' violation of the ban through a broadcast
advertisement on cable television for Crown Royal Whiskey on March
20, 1996.2 8 Additionally, the twenty year decline in hard liquor sales
and consumption contributed to the lifting of the ban. 9 The ban re-
240. See Law, supra note 154, at 912.
241. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; see also Law, supra note 154, at 921.
242. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 475-78 (2d ed.
1988) (explaining the regulatory aspects maintained by Congress and the Constitu-
tion).
243. See id.
244. See Liquor Ads; Restraint Was Better, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Nov. 13, 1996, at B4,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; see also Leonhardt & France, supra
note 225, at 46.
245. See Steve Younger, Comment, Alcoholic Beverage Advertising on the Airwaves:
Alternatives to a Ban or Counteradvertising, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1139, 1144-45 (1987).
246. See Leonhardt & France, supra note 225, at 46; see also Anthony Faiola, Li-
quor Ads on TV: A Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1996, at H3
(discussing the lift of the ban and the refusal of the major networks to air "hard"
liquor advertisements).
247. See Bob Kievra, Restrictions Urged for Liquor, Tobacco Ads; McGovern and
Meehan Want Federal Agencies to Adopt Tough New Standards, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE
WORCESTER, Nov. 14, 1996, at B5, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
248. See Denise Gellene, Seagram Bucks Voluntary Ban on TV Advertising With
Spot on Cable, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1996, at D3.
249. See Leonhardt & France, supra note 225, at 46. "From 1980 to 1995, hard-li-
quor consumption in the United States dropped 27.7%, from 449 million gallons a
moval outraged President Clinton, the FCC, and Congress, all of whom
urged DISCUS to resume the ban or face regulation similar to that
which the FDA imposed on cigarette manufacturers.2" DISCUS re-
fused to resume the ban, but stated that the industry would not target
children through its advertisements. 1
D. Implications of the FDA Ruling on Alcohol and Other Industries
Particularly with the drop of the spirits advertisement ban, Con-
gress252 and groups such as the Coalition for the Prevention of Alco-
hol Problems and MADD,2" seek alcohol advertising regulations simi-
lar to those the FDA issued for the tobacco industry." These groups,
dismayed with the double standard applied to tobacco and alcohol
products, demand alcohol advertising regulations.255 If the FDA is suc-
cessful in regulating tobacco, expansion of regulation to industries such
as the alcohol industry would be inevitable, and in fact, law makers
have already drafted such legislation." Other industries, such as the
medical device industry, feel threatened by the expansion of regulation
to tobacco and believe that they might be the next target for regula-
tion.257 Currently, the FDA regulates "products that account for 25
cents of every dollar spent" in America." If the FDA expands its
reach, that figure increases, but only time can tell by how much.
year to 335 million. In that time, beer consumption rose 5.1% to 5.8 billion gallons,
and wine consumption fell 0.5% to 470.2 million gallons." Harry Berkowitz, Official:
Keep TV Teetotal, NEWSDAY, Nov. 9, 1996, at A4.
250. See Leonhardt & France, supra note 225, at 46.
251. See Kievra, supra note 247, at B5.
252. See Kennedy Unveils Ad Limits to Combat Underage Drinking, supra note
222, at 1. Ironically, Kennedy's bill to curb alcohol ads echoes the regulations issued
by the FDA restricting tobacco advertisements. See id.
253. See Gellene, supra note 248, at D3.
254. See Teinowitz, supra note 222, at 8; see also Field Supports Tobacco Focus,
Seeks More Action on Alcohol; Addiction Field, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WE., Aug.
21, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL 12027102.
255. See Gellene, supra note 248, at D3.
256. See Teinowitz & Ingrassia, supra note 224, at 116; see also Tobacco Declared
'Restricted Device'; Is more Information-Regulation by FDA at Hand?, supra note
185 (discussing the possibility of the FDA broadening its regulations into other indus-
tries such as the alcohol industry).
257. See Tobacco Declared 'Restricted Device; 'Is more Information-Regulation by
FDA at Hand?, supra note 185.
258. Joshua Wolf Shenk, Warning: Cutting the FDA Could Be Hazardous to Your
Health, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1996, at 17, 17, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File.
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CONCLUSION
The FDA's ruling, which regulates tobacco sales, distribution, and
advertising confronts several established American principles. The rul-
ing has thrust tobacco into a tug of war with the First Amendment,
capitalism, administrative agency power, and the health of the nation.
In the ongoing litigation, the tobacco and advertising industries are
fighting the FDA to protect their freedom of speech-their right to
advertise. The FDA, on the other hand, is fighting to protect the health
of future generations and the non-exhaustion of state funds. The real
question is whether this ruling sufficiently balances the interests of the
Constitution, big business, and health. The North Carolina court has
answered that question, but its decision has been appealed. However,
assuming the court battle takes three years and the litigation postpones
the regulations from taking effect, that three years will allow approxi-
mately 3,285,000 adolescents to become regular smokers."9
The probability that the ruling in its entirety will go into effect is
slim. The ruling has little support in Congress given the astounding
Republican campaign contributions from tobacco manufacturers and
the opposition of tobacco friendly representatives from the South. Addi-
tionally, the ruling faces opposition from the powerful alcohol and med-
ical device industries fearful of being the next target of expansive regu-
lation. Some view the FDA's expansive regulation into non-traditional
industries as the FDA (and the government) going too far, and wonder
where it will stop. Others, however, agreeing with the FDA, believe that
the cost to society of not implementing the FDA ruling is greater than
the threat of expansive regulation. If tobacco manufacturers are re-
quired to cease targeting children with their advertising and marketing,
the number of future adult regular smokers that die prematurely will be
reduced. As a direct result of a reduction in the number of smokers and
tobacco-related illnesses, the states will save millions of dollars. Soci-
ety, as a whole, will be healthier and happier.
The FDA and its supporters view the health of America's people as
more important than the health of big business. It will be interesting to
observe in the near future whether the health of America's people and
259. See Travis, supra note 3, at C3.
the overwhelming public support for the FDA ruling will be powerful
enough to prevail over big business.
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